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In this paper we study a version of constructive linear-time temporal logic (LTL) with
the “next” temporal operator. The logic is originally due to Davies, who has shown that
the proof system of the logic corresponds to a type system for binding-time analysis
via the Curry–Howard isomorphism. However, he did not investigate the logic itself in
detail; he has proved only that the logic augmented with negation and classical reasoning
is equivalent to (the “next” fragment of) the standard formulation of classical linear-
time temporal logic. We give natural deduction, sequent calculus and Hilbert-style proof
systems for constructive LTL with conjunction, disjunction and falsehood, and show that
the sequent calculus enjoys cut elimination. Moreover, we also consider Kripke semantics
and prove soundness and completeness. One distinguishing feature of this logic is that
distributivity of the “next” operator over disjunction “©(A∨ B) ⊃ ©A∨©B” is rejected in
view of a type-theoretic interpretation.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Temporal logic is a family of (modal) logics in which the truth of propositions depends on time, and is useful to describe
various properties of state transition systems. Linear-time temporal logic (LTL, for short), which is used to reason about
properties of a ﬁxed execution path of a state transition system, is temporal logic in which each time has a unique time
that follows it.
In this paper, we study a constructive propositional LTL with only the “next” temporal operator ©. Our contributions are
(1) to give natural deduction, sequent calculus (satisfying cut elimination), and Hilbert-style proof systems and (2) to give
Kripke-style semantics together with a completeness theorem.
The characteristic feature of our version of LTL is that the “distributivity law” ©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©A ∨ ©B , is not admitted.
This law is a theorem in the classical LTL [1], and is also admitted in intuitionistic LTL previously considered, such as the
ones by Ewald [2] and by Maier [3]. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst version of intuitionistic LTL without this law.
The motivation not to admit the distributivity law comes from the type-theoretic interpretation of the © operator, ﬁrst
given by Davies [4]. He pointed out that a proof system of LTL can be related to a type system of (multi-level) binding-
time analysis, which is used in oﬄine partial evaluation [5] to determine which part of a program can be computed at
specialization-time and which is residualized. According to this correspondence, a formula ©A, which logically means that
A holds at the next time, is interpreted as a type of (residual) code of type A; introduction and elimination rules of © are
as Lisp-like quasiquote and unquote, respectively. As a result, λ© terms can be considered as program-generating programs,
such as parser generators or generating extensions, which manipulate code fragments by the quasiquotation mechanism.
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of the distributivity law would be considered a function which takes a value of type ©(A ∨ B) and returns a value of type
©A ∨ ©B . While a value of the return type must be of type ©A or type ©B with a tag indicating which of the two is
actually the case, a value of the argument type is quoted code, which will not be executed until the next time comes, that is,
until the residual code is executed; it is in general impossible to know which value (A or B) this code evaluates to now
(unless a Lisp-like eval function was available). From this observation, we conclude that there is no method to turn a value
of type ©(A ∨ B) into a value of type ©A ∨ ©B , and hence ©A ∨ ©B should be strictly stronger than ©(A ∨ B).
Similarly, we also reject ©⊥ ⊃ ⊥, which is admitted in classical LTL. The falsehood ⊥ is interpreted as a type which has
no value, so a program of type ⊥ does not terminate normally. However, a program of type ©⊥ can terminate normally,
although the resulting value (which is code of type ⊥) would not, when executed.
In terms of logic, these observations would be explained as follows. ©(A ∨ B) is the assertion that “either A or B will
hold at the next time.” This does not necessarily mean that the disjunct that will be actually the case can be speciﬁed at
the current time; in general, it can be decided only at the next time. On the other hand, intuitionistically ©A ∨©B means
either ©A or ©B is true. So when one makes this assertion, the disjunct (that is, either ©A or ©B) must be speciﬁed at
the time of assertion (that is, the current time). This explains why ©(A∨ B) does not imply ©A∨©B . Similarly, even if we
know that the situation will be inconsistent at the next time, it does not mean that the current situation is also inconsistent.
So ©⊥ (inconsistency at the next time) does not imply ⊥ (inconsistency at the current time). In short, the disjunction and
falsehood at the next time and at the current time are distinguished. This distinction leads us to the rejection of the laws
©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©A ∨ ©B and ©⊥ ⊃ ⊥. We will discuss a related issue in Section 6.2.
Davies deﬁned a natural deduction system for a constructive LTL with only the “next” operator © and implication, and
derived via the Curry–Howard isomorphism a typed λ-calculus λ© , which was formally shown to be equivalent to a type
system of multi-level binding-time analysis by Glück and Jørgensen [6]. Unfortunately, however, Davies did not investigate
his system in detail, from a logical point of view: he proved only that his system augmented with negation and classical
reasoning is equivalent to the classical LTL (Proposition 1 below), even though the logic can be considered a constructive
version of LTL. The main aim of this paper is to see how his system is formalized in terms of Kripke semantics and sequent
calculus. Davies’ original system is an implicational fragment, but we also consider other connectives.1
This paper is an extended version of the authors’ previous work [7]. In addition to the previous version, this paper
considers (1) falsehood in our logic, (2) more concise Kripke semantics, and (3) some discussions on informal interpretation
of the semantics we give.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the natural-deduction proof system.
We ﬁrst review the system by Davies, and extend it with conjunction, disjunction and falsehood. In Section 3 we deﬁne a
sequent calculus LJ© , which is equivalent to the natural deduction, with cut-elimination theorem. In Section 4, we introduce
a Hilbert-style proof system which is equivalent to the natural deduction given in Section 2. Section 5 considers Kripke
semantics. It turns out that, although our logic is considered to be a version of LTL, a straightforward extension of classical
semantics is not suitable for our interpretation of ©. Having shown the problem, we introduce a suitable Kripke semantics
and prove soundness and completeness theorems. Finally, in Section 6, we brieﬂy summarize the paper, and discuss related
work. We will also discuss two different possible interpretations of modality ©, which is related to some diﬃculties we
encounter in the paper. A brief remark on algebraic semantics is also made.
2. Natural deduction
In this section, we ﬁrst recall the natural deduction system by Davies and some of its properties, and then extend the
system with conjunction, disjunction and falsehood.
2.1. Results by Davies
The temporal logic Davies considered contains only © (“next” operator) and ⊃ (intuitionistic implication). So here we
consider formulas containing only these two connectives.
A judgment in his system takes the form
An11 , . . . , A
nk
k  Bm
where Ai, B are formulas and ni,m are natural numbers; it is read “B holds at time m under the assumption that Ai holds at
time ni (for i = 1, . . . ,k).” In what follows, we use A, B,C, D for formulas, k, l,m,n for natural numbers, F ,G for annotated
formulas An (i.e. formulas with time annotation), and Γ, for sets of annotated formulas. We consider the left-hand side
of a judgment a set. The notation ©n A denotes the formula A preﬁxed by n ©’s.
Inference rules of Davies’ system are listed in Fig. 1. The rules ⊃I, ⊃E, and Axiom are standard. The other two, the
introduction and elimination rules for © operator, state that A holds at time n + 1 if and only if ©A holds at time n. This
is quite natural since ©A means that “A holds at the next time.”
1 Precisely speaking, Davies extended λ© with pairing and natural numbers, but did not consider conjunction or disjunction in his logic.
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Γ  (A ⊃ B)n Γ  An
Γ  Bn (⊃E)
Γ  (©A)n
Γ  An+1 (©E)
Γ, An  Bn
Γ  (A ⊃ B)n (⊃I)
Γ  An+1
Γ  (©A)n (©I)
Fig. 1. Derivation rules of Davies’ system.
Γ  (A ∧ B)n
Γ  An (∧E1)
Γ  (A ∧ B)n
Γ  Bn (∧E2)
Γ  (A ∨ B)n Γ, An  Cn Γ, Bn  Cn
Γ  Cn (∨E)
Γ  ⊥n
Γ  An (⊥E)
Γ  An Γ  Bn
Γ  (A ∧ B)n (∧I)
Γ  An
Γ  (A ∨ B)n (∨I1)
Γ  Bn
Γ  (A ∨ B)n (∨I2)
Fig. 2. Additional rules for full NJ© .
To show that © operator in this system is indeed the “next” operator in linear-time temporal logic, Davies compared his
system with L© , a well-known Hilbert-style proof system of the fragment of classical linear-time temporal logic consisting
of only implication, negation and next operators. The axiomatization is given by Stirling, who also proved that L© is sound
and complete for the standard semantics [1]. The axioms and rules of L© are as follows:
Axioms • any classical tautology instance
• ©¬A ⊃ ¬©A
• ¬©A ⊃ ©¬A
• ©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ ©A ⊃ ©B
Rules • if A ⊃ B and A are theorems, then so is B
• if A is a theorem, then so is ©A
Davies extended his system by adding negation with its classical rule (which reads Γ, (¬A)n  An implies Γ  An), and
proved that the extended version is equivalent to L© in the following sense [4]:
Proposition 1. A judgment An11 , . . . , A
nk
k  Bm is provable in the extended system if and only if ©n1 A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ ©nk Ak ⊃ ©mB has a
proof in L© . In particular, ·  A0 is provable if and only if A is a theorem of L© .
2.2. Full system
Next we extend Davies’ system with conjunction, disjunction and falsehood. We call the extended system NJ© . Additional
derivation rules are listed in Fig. 2. The rules for conjunction and introduction rules for disjunction are fairly straightforward,
but the other two rules would require some explanation.
In ∨E, the formula being eliminated must have the same time as the succedent of the conclusion. At ﬁrst sight it may
seem strange, but in fact this restriction is essential for our system. Indeed, without this restriction we could prove the
distributivity law ©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©A ∨ ©B , which should not be a tautology as mentioned above, as follows:
(©(A ∨ B))0  (©(A ∨ B))0
(©(A ∨ B))0  (A ∨ B)1
(©(A ∨ B))0, A1  A1
(©(A ∨ B))0, A1  (©A)0
(©(A ∨ B))0, A1  (©A ∨ ©B)0
(©(A ∨ B))0, B1  B1
(©(A ∨ B))0, B1  (©B)0
(©(A ∨ B))0, B1  (©A ∨ ©B)0
(©(A ∨ B))0  (©A ∨ ©B)0 ∨E
In this proof, disjunction being eliminated has time 1 while the time of the succedent is 0.
For the same reason, we need to restrict the time of A in ⊥E to be the same as the time of ⊥ being eliminated.
Otherwise, ©⊥ ⊃ ⊥ would be a theorem.
In fact, the problem would occur only if we allowed the time of the succedent to be strictly less than that of the formula
being eliminated. Indeed, a slight variation of ∨E in which Cn is changed to Cm with the side condition m  n is provable
in NJ© by using ©I and ©E. In the same way, a variant of ⊥E which derives Am from ⊥n for m n is also provable in NJ© .
3. Sequent calculus
In this section we give another formalization LJ© of our logic in the sequent calculus style. After verifying that the
system LJ© is equivalent to NJ© previously deﬁned, we prove the cut-elimination theorem for LJ© .
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Γ, An ⇒ An (Init)
Γ ⇒ An Γ, Bn ⇒ F
Γ, (A ⊃ B)n ⇒ F (⊃L)
Γ, An ⇒ F
Γ, (A ∧ B)n ⇒ F (∧L1)
Γ, Bn ⇒ F
Γ, (A ∧ B)n ⇒ F (∧L2)
Γ, An ⇒ Cn+m Γ, Bn ⇒ Cn+m
Γ, (A ∨ B)n ⇒ Cn+m (∨L)
Γ, An+1 ⇒ F
Γ, (©A)n ⇒ F (©L)
(A is atomic)
Γ,⊥n ⇒ An+m (⊥L)
Γ ⇒ F F , ⇒ G
Γ, ⇒ G (Cut)
Γ, An ⇒ Bn
Γ ⇒ (A ⊃ B)n (⊃R)
Γ ⇒ An Γ ⇒ Bn
Γ ⇒ (A ∧ B)n (∧R)
Γ ⇒ An
Γ ⇒ (A ∨ B)n (∨R1)
Γ ⇒ Bn
Γ ⇒ (A ∨ B)n (∨R2)
Γ ⇒ An+1
Γ ⇒ (©A)n (©R)
Fig. 3. Inference rules of LJ© .
3.1. Formalization
Sequents of LJ© have the form Γ ⇒ F where Γ is a set of annotated formulas and F is an annotated formula. Inference
rules of LJ© are listed in Fig. 3.
Since we regard the left-hand side of a sequent as a set, exchange and contraction rules are not explicitly included. There
is no explicit weakening rule, either—we included weakening implicitly by allowing extra formulas in the rules Init and ⊥L.
Most of the rules are standard, but we comment on some rules. In rules Init and ⊥L, we restricted the right-hand side to be
atomic to make the proof of the cut-elimination theorem simpler (but this does not reduce the proof-theoretic strength). In
rules ⊥L and ∨L, the time of the succedent must be no less than that of the principal formula (⊥ and A ∨ B , respectively).
This corresponds to the issue mentioned in Section 2 that we cannot eliminate falsehood or disjunction with a succedent
of an earlier time.
LJ© is equivalent to NJ© in the following sense:
Theorem 2. A sequent Γ ⇒ F is provable in LJ© if and only if Γ  F is provable in NJ© .
To prove this, it is suﬃcient to check that all rules of LJ© are admissible in NJ© and vice versa. For the former part we
need the admissibility of weakening and cut in natural deduction:
Lemma 3.
1. If Γ  F is provable, then Γ,  F is also provable.
2. If Γ  F and F ,  G are provable, then Γ,  G is also provable.
Then, both directions are proved by easy induction, so we omit the details.
3.2. Cut elimination
Next we prove the cut-elimination theorem by showing that the cut rule is admissible in the cut-free fragment of LJ© .
The basic strategy of the proof is similar to Pfenning’s structural cut elimination [8], although structural cut elimination
does not introduce any measure like level or rank deﬁned below.
Theorem 4. If Γ ⇒ F and F , ⇒ G are provable without cut, then Γ, ⇒ G is also provable without cut.
We ﬁrst introduce several auxiliary notions and sketch the proof strategy.
Deﬁnition 5.
1. We simply say a cut for any instance of the rule Cut (or for a pair of derivations whose conclusions match the premises
of Cut).
2. In a given cut, its cut formula is the formula being eliminated (F in the rule Cut of Fig. 3).
3. The level of a cut is the sum of the heights of the derivations of the premises.
4. The rank of a formula A, denoted by |A|, is deﬁned by: |A| = 0 if A is atomic, and |A ⊃ B| = |A ∧ B| = |A ∨ B| =
1+max(|A|, |B|).
5. The rank of a cut is the rank of the cut formula A (without time annotation).
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words, we will prove that any cut is either
1. reduced to a cut with a smaller rank (and possibly with a larger level),
2. reduced to a cut on F with a smaller level, or
3. eliminated immediately.
Let us call the derivation of Γ ⇒ F and F , ⇒ G assumed in the theorem D1 and D2 respectively, and the rules used
in the last steps of them R1 and R2.
The proof is done by case analysis on R1 and R2, and except for some cases it is rather straightforward to rewrite a
given cut into a simpler one. However, a problem stems from the side condition in ∨L and ⊥L. Consider the case R1 = ∨L:
Γ, An ⇒ Cm Γ, Bn ⇒ Cm
Γ, (A ∨ B)n ⇒ Cm ∨L Cm, ⇒ Dl
Γ, (A ∨ B)n, ⇒ Dl Cut
At ﬁrst sight, it may seem natural to rewrite this derivation into the following one:
Γ, An ⇒ Cm Cm, ⇒ Dl
Γ, An, ⇒ Dl Cut
Γ, Bn ⇒ Cm Cm, ⇒ Dl
Γ, Bn, ⇒ Dl Cut
Γ, (A ∨ B)n, ⇒ Dl ∨L
However, this is not always a valid derivation, because it is not necessarily the case that l n.
By case analysis on R2 we can see that the problem is essential when the cut formula C is neither atomic formula nor
disjunction (details are presented below). In these cases we need to transform D1 appropriately before reducing the cut. To
this end, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 6. If a sequent S ≡ Γ ⇒ F has a cut-free derivation D and F is neither atomic formula nor disjunction, then there exists a
cut-free derivationD′ of S such that the last rule used inD′ is a right rule.
Proof. From the assumption that F is neither atomic formula nor disjunction, the derivation ends with either ⊃R, ∧R, or
©R followed by some (possibly zero) left rules. Note that neither Init nor ⊥L can derive Γ ⇒ F unless F is atomic.
From this observation we can see that it is suﬃcient to show that these three right rules commute with any left rule
following them:
. . .
Ti
S ′i
Right
. . .
S Left
⇒
. . . Ti . . .
S ′ Left
S
Right
This is checked by straightforward case analysis. The point is that rules ⊃R, ∧R, or ©R have only one premise (this is
crucial when the left rule is ∨L).
For example, if the left rule is ⊃L and the right rule is ⊃R, then
Γ ⇒ An
Γ, Bn,Cm ⇒ Dm
Γ, Bn ⇒ (C ⊃ D)m ⊃R
Γ, (A ⊃ B)n ⇒ (C ⊃ D)m ⊃L
⇒
Γ ⇒ An Γ, Bn,Cm ⇒ Dm
Γ, (A ⊃ B)n,Cm ⇒ Dm ⊃L
Γ, (A ⊃ B)n ⇒ (C ⊃ D)m ⊃R
and for ∨L and ©R we have
Γ, An ⇒ Cm+1
Γ, An ⇒ (©C)m ©R
Γ, Bn ⇒ Cm+1
Γ, Bn ⇒ (©C)m ©R (m n)
Γ, (A ∨ B)n ⇒ (©C)m ∨L
⇒
Γ, An ⇒ Cm+1 Γ, Bn ⇒ Cm+1 (m+ 1 n)
Γ, (A ∨ B)n ⇒ Cm+1 ∨L
Γ, (A ∨ B)n ⇒ (©C)m ©R
Other cases are similar.
After checking this, we can prove the lemma by induction on the number of left rules following the last right rule. 
Proof of Theorem 4. By lexicographic induction on the rank and the level of a cut. We split the situation into ﬁve cases:
1. F is not principal in D2;
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(a) R1 is neither ∨L nor ⊥L;
(b) R1 = ⊥L;
(c) R1 = ∨L, and F is either atomic or disjunction;
(d) R1 = ∨L, and F is neither atomic nor disjunction.
In case 1, the cut level is easily reduced (without changing the rank); we just lift the cut into D2. As the cut formula is
not principal in D2, it occurs in all premises of R2, so this procedure works. For example, if R2 = ©L we proceed
Γ ⇒ F
F ,′, An+1 ⇒ G
F ,′,©An ⇒ G ©L
Γ,′,©An ⇒ G Cut
⇒
Γ ⇒ F F ,′, An+1 ⇒ G
Γ,′, An+1 ⇒ G Cut
Γ,′,©An ⇒ G ©L
In case 2(a), if R1 is a right rule, we can reduce the cut into cut(s) on subformula(s) of F . For example, if the cut formula
is F = (A ⊃ B)n , we rewrite the cut as follows:
Γ, An ⇒ Bn
Γ ⇒ (A ⊃ B)n ⊃R
 ⇒ An , Bn ⇒ G
,(A ⊃ B)n ⇒ G ⊃L
Γ, ⇒ G Cut
⇒
 ⇒ An Γ, An ⇒ Bn
Γ, ⇒ Bn Cut , Bn ⇒ G
Γ, ⇒ G Cut
Since |A| < |A ⊃ B|, by the induction hypothesis the cut on A can be eliminated. So Γ, ⇒ Bn has a cut-free derivation.
Then, since |B| < |A ⊃ B|, by the induction hypothesis the cut on B can also be eliminated. This means that Γ, ⇒ G has
a cut-free proof.
If R1 is not a right rule, the cut can be lifted into D1, producing a cut of smaller level (if R1 is neither ∨L nor ⊥L, this
process does not cause the problem with time annotations mentioned above).
In case 2(b), from the side condition of ⊥L, the cut formula F is atomic. So there are only two possibilities: R2 = ⊥L, or
R2 = Init. The second case is easily checked, so we only need to check the ﬁrst case.
If R2 = ⊥L, the cut has the from
Γ,⊥n ⇒ ⊥m ⊥m, ⇒ Al
Γ,⊥n, ⇒ Al Cut
where nm l. In this case the conclusion can be derived directly by using ⊥L because the side condition n l is met.
In case 2(c), the rule R2 is Init, ⊥L, or ∨L. The case of Init is obvious. If R2 = ∨L, derivations D1 and D2 have the forms
D1 = Γ, A
n ⇒ (C1 ∨ C2)m Γ, Bn ⇒ (C1 ∨ C2)m
Γ, (A ∨ B)n ⇒ (C1 ∨ C2)m ∨L
D2 = C
m
1 , ⇒ Dl Cm2 , ⇒ Dl
(C1 ∨ C2)m, ⇒ Dl
∨L
and we have n m and m  l from the side condition of ∨L. Therefore by lifting D2 into D1 we obtain a cut of smaller
level. The case of ⊥L is similar.
The last case is the case 2(d), in which F is neither atomic nor disjunction. In this case, using Lemma 6 we ﬁrst
rewrite D1 into another derivation D′1 ending with a right rule. Then, the given cut is transformed into a principal cut,
which is easily reduced into a cut of smaller rank (as mentioned in case 2(a)). 
From the argument above, we obtain the cut-elimination theorem for LJ© . This can be proved by induction on deriva-
tions.
Theorem 7. If a sequent is provable in LJ© , then it has a cut-free proof.
The following is an easy consequence of cut-elimination theorem and equivalence of LJ© and NJ© .
Theorem 8. In neither LJ© nor NJ© the distributivity law ©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©A ∨ ©B is provable, as well as ©⊥ ⊃ ⊥.
This result shows that our systems indeed have an intended property of rejecting these laws.
K. Kojima, A. Igarashi / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1491–1503 14974. Hilbert-style axiomatization
Next we brieﬂy describe how the logic deﬁned above is characterized in the Hilbert-style. Interestingly, there exists a
quite simple axiomatization.
Proposition 9. Consider the proof system given by the following sets of axioms and rules.
Axioms • any intuitionistic tautology instance
• ©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ ©A ⊃ ©B
• (©A ⊃ ©B) ⊃ ©(A ⊃ B)
Rules • if A ⊃ B and A are theorems, then so is B
• if A is a theorem, then so is ©A
Then, this system is equivalent to NJ© in the same sense as Proposition 1.
Therefore we can say that our logic, formalized as NJ© in Section 2, is obtained by adding axiom (©A ⊃ ©B) ⊃
©(A ⊃ B), which we call CK as it is the “converse” of the axiom K, to the minimal normal intuitionistic modal logic
(with only  modality).
The axiomatization above (in particular, the axiom CK) is due to Yuse and Igarashi [9]. They extended Davies’ natural
deduction system and λ© with  operator, which is similar to “always” operator in classical LTL, and conjectured that their
Hilbert-style system and natural deduction system are equivalent. The axiomatization above is its -free fragment.
Below we are going to sketch the proof. First, we show that the axioms and rules are sound with respect to NJ© . The
axiom CK is the only non-standard clause, so we only check this axiom. Provability of CK is easily seen from the following
derivation:
(©A ⊃ ©B)0, A1  (©A ⊃ ©B)0
(©A ⊃ ©B)0, A1  A1
(©A ⊃ ©B)0, A1  (©A)0 ©I
(©A ⊃ ©B)0, A1  (©B)0 ⊃E
(©A ⊃ ©B)0, A1  B1 ©E
(©A ⊃ ©B)0  (A ⊃ B)1 ⊃I
(©A ⊃ ©B)0  (©(A ⊃ B))0 ©I
·  ((©A ⊃ ©B) ⊃ ©(A ⊃ B))0 ⊃I
For the converse, we only mention the admissibility of ⊃I, which is the most essential part (actually ∨E is also nontrivial,
but can be checked in a similar way). Putting Γ aside, this rule says that “if An  Bn , then ·  (A ⊃ B)n .” To prove this rule
is admissible, it is suﬃcient to show that “if ©n A ⊃ ©nB , then ©n(A ⊃ B),” and this is an immediate consequence of the
axiom CK.
5. Kripke semantics
In this section, we consider Kripke semantics for the logic deﬁned above, and establish soundness and completeness for
that semantics.
First, let us brieﬂy review existing approaches upon which our study is based. Classically, the semantics of modal logic is
typically given by using relational structures (Kripke frames). In the intuitionistic setting, its analogues are commonly used
in the literature ([2,10–14], for example). Following one of the existing approaches, we consider so-called birelational Kripke
frames. A birelational Kripke frame consists of a set of possible worlds together with two accessibility relations R and .
These two relations are taken from classical modal logic and intuitionistic logic, respectively, and therefore  is assumed to
be a partial order.
Before introducing technical details, we provide a road map for the rest of this section. First we mention that classical
LTL can be described in terms of Kripke frames whose accessibility relation is a function. From this fact it seems natural
to consider a semantics based on birelational semantics whose modal accessibility is a function. Unfortunately, however,
exploiting this condition turns out to be inappropriate, because the resulting semantics admits the distributivity law, which
we need to avoid. After seeing that, we examine an already known class of birelational frames, IM-frames [13]. We can give
a class of IM-frames which corresponds to our logic, by identifying the corresponding frame condition. This approach works
well in the sense that it establishes a semantics for which soundness and completeness hold, but it is not satisfactory for
us since linearity of time has been lost. Moreover, the meaning of the frame condition is not intuitively understandable.
For this reason, we consider deriving another version from this semantics, by decomposing modal accessibility relation
of IM-frames (actually, this decomposition process appears implicitly in the proof of completeness). This gives another
class of birelational frames whose modal accessibility is a partial function with some properties. As a result we obtain an
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frame conditions.
5.1. Functional Kripke frames
In this subsection, we are going to examine a class of birelational Kripke frames which comes from the semantics of
classical LTL in a fairly straightforward manner. Although this semantics seems natural, and works well for the implicational
fragment, it turns out that it admits distributivity law which we reject.
Consider Kripke frames whose accessibility relation R on possible worlds is a function. Such frames are said to be func-
tional. The term “functional frame” is, to our knowledge, ﬁrst used by Segerberg [15] (to be precise, he used the terminology
“totally functional frames” to mean functional frames in our terminology), but not in the context of the semantics of LTL.
This condition implies that, in a functional Kripke frame, the next state of a given state is uniquely determined, hence justi-
fying “linear time.” Although the semantics of classical LTL is often given by using execution paths of transition systems, it
is easy to translate it into Kripke-style semantics with functional frames.
Now, let us consider functional frames augmented by an intuitionistic accessibility relation .
Deﬁnition 10. An intuitionistic functional frame is a triple 〈W ,, R〉 of a nonempty set W , a partial order  on W and a
function R from W to W such that ( ; R) = (R ;) holds. Here (· ; ·) stands for the composition of binary relations deﬁned
by x (R ; S) y ⇐⇒ ∃z.(x R z S y), regarding a function as a special case of binary relations.
Hereafter, we simply say functional frame when no confusion arises.
Using functional frames we can deﬁne a satisfaction relation on formulas.
Deﬁnition 11. Let 〈W ,, R〉 be a functional frame and  be a binary relation between W and the set of propositional
variables such that w  w ′ and w  p imply w ′  p. Then we can extend  to formulas by induction with
• w  A ⊃ B ⇐⇒ for all w ′ , if w  w ′ and w ′  A then w ′  B;
• w  A ∨ B ⇐⇒ w  A or w  B;
• w  A ∧ B ⇐⇒ w  A and w  B;
• w ⊥ never occurs; and
• w ©A ⇐⇒ for all w ′ , if w R w ′ then w ′  A.
We also write w  An for w ©n A.
As is easily veriﬁed by induction on the construction of formulas, this semantics satisﬁes the heredity condition.
Lemma 12. If w  w ′ and w  A, then w ′  A.
It is not very diﬃcult to see that soundness and completeness hold for the ∨,⊥-free fragment. Soundness is proved by
straightforward induction on the derivation. Completeness is proved by the canonical model technique, which is sketched
below.
For a set T of formulas, we write ©−1T for the set {A | ©A ∈ T } and ©T for {©A | A ∈ T }. Take the set of all theories
(sets of formulas closed under deduction) of ∨,⊥-free fragment as W , let  be set-inclusion, and R the function which
maps each theory T to the theory ©−1T . Then we can show that this deﬁnes a functional frame, and if we deﬁne  to be
the satisfaction relation such that T  p ⇐⇒ p ∈ T , it holds that T  A ⇐⇒ A ∈ T for each formula A, as usual. Finally, if
Γ  An is not provable, take the set {A | Γ  A0} as T . Then T  Γ holds but T  An does not.
The proof strategy above is almost standard, but notice that we took the set of all theories as W , instead of taking only
prime theories. When we consider disjunction and falsehood, the same method will not work. In fact, functional frames are
not appropriate in the presence of these connectives, because they validate the laws ©(A ∨ B) ⊃ ©A ∨ ©B and ©⊥ ⊃ ⊥,
which we have rejected. It does not seem easy to adjust the deﬁnition of the satisfaction relation to exclude them without
relaxing the functionality condition.
In the next subsection, we put functionality aside and consider a large class of frames, and try to ﬁnd its subclass
corresponding to the intended logic.
5.2. Semantics based on IM-frames
As we have mentioned after Theorem 8, the logic deﬁned by NJ© (or other proof systems deﬁned above) is an appropri-
ate one from our motivation. So the reason why completeness for the full system fails is that the choice of functional frame
was incorrect. Therefore the next question is what kind of frames correspond to our logic.
The ﬁrst answer we give is IM©-frames deﬁned below.
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1. Let W be a nonempty set,  a partial order on W , and R a binary relation on W . We call the triple 〈W ,, R〉 an
IM-frame if it satisﬁes ( ; R ;) = R .
2. An IM©-frame is an IM-frame 〈W ,, R〉 satisfying the condition: if w R v , then there exists w ′ such that w  w ′ and
∀u ∈ W .(w ′ R u ⇐⇒ v  u).
Note that, in the deﬁnition of IM©-frame above, R is not assumed to be a function.
The satisfaction relation is deﬁned in the same way as the functional frame semantics, and heredity is also veriﬁed easily.
Theorem 14 (Soundness). Suppose that Γ  An is provable in NJ© . Then for any IM©-frame 〈W ,, R〉, satisfaction relation , and
possible world w ∈ W such that w  Γ , it holds that w  An.
Proof. Induction on the derivation. 
Theorem 15 (Completeness). If w  Γ implies w  An for any IM©-frame 〈W ,, R〉, satisfaction relation , and possible world
w ∈ W , then there exists a derivation of Γ  An.
To prove this, we use the canonical model construction. The canonical Kripke frame is deﬁned in the usual way:
Deﬁnition 16.
1. A set of formulas T is said to be a theory if it is deductively closed (if Γ  A0 is provable for some ﬁnite Γ ⊆ T , then
A ∈ T ) and consistent (⊥ /∈ T ).
2. A theory T is said to be prime if A ∨ B ∈ T implies either A ∈ T or B ∈ T .
3. The canonical Kripke frame is the triple 〈W ,, R〉 such that W is the set of prime theories,  the set-inclusion on W ,
and R the relation deﬁned by: T R T ′ ⇐⇒ ©−1T ⊆ T ′ .
Then it is easy to see that the following hold.
1. 〈W ,, R〉 forms an IM-frame.
2. Let  be the canonical valuation deﬁned by: T  p ⇐⇒ p ∈ T for each propositional variable p. Then, T  A ⇐⇒ A ∈
T holds for each formula A.
Therefore, we only need to check that the canonical frame is indeed an IM©-frame. Below we check that it satisﬁes the
condition of Deﬁnition 13(2).
Lemma 17. Let S, T ∈ W . Then, ∀X ∈ W (T R X ⇐⇒ S ⊆ X) if and only if ©−1T = S.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is obvious. To prove the other direction by contraposition, assume ©−1T = S . Then we
have either ©−1T ⊆ S or S ⊆ ©−1T . In the ﬁrst case, T R X ⇐⇒ S ⊆ X does not hold when X = S . In the second case,
there exists some formula A such that A ∈ S and A /∈ ©−1T . Then, in the usual way we can prove that there exists a prime
theory V such that ©−1T ⊆ V and A /∈ V (therefore T R V but S ⊆ V ). 
Lemma 18. For S, T ∈ W such that S R T , there exists a theory U (not necessarily prime) satisfying ©−1U = S and T ⊆ U .
Proof. Let U be the set of all formulas provable from T and ©S . First, we check that U is a theory. It is clear that U is
deductively closed. To check U is consistent, suppose ⊥ ∈ U . Then we have ©⊥ ∈ U , hence ⊥ ∈ ©−1U = S , a contradiction.
We are going to prove that ©−1U = S and T ⊆ U hold for this U . Clearly, T ⊆ U holds by deﬁnition. It is also easy
to see that S ⊆ ©−1U : if A ∈ S , then ©A ∈ ©S ⊆ U , and from this A ∈ ©−1U follows. For the converse, let A be a
formula in ©−1U . Then we have ©A ∈ U . Since U is the smallest theory containing T and ©S , there exist formulas
A1, . . . , An ∈ S (n  0) such that ©A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ ©An ⊃ ©A ∈ T . Then, since axiom CK is provable, we also have ©(A1 ⊃
· · · ⊃ An ⊃ A) ∈ T . This implies that A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ An ⊃ A ∈ ©−1T ⊆ S holds. As Ai ∈ S from the assumption, we conclude that
A ∈ S , as required. 
Lemma 19. Let S, T ∈ W such that S R T . Then, any maximal element of
X = {U ∣∣ U is a theory such that ©−1U = S and T ⊆ U}
is prime.
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U with A1 ∨ A2, A1, A2, respectively. It is suﬃcient to prove that U0 = U .
For i = 1,2 the theory ©−1Ui is a proper extension of ©−1U = S , so there exists a formula Bi ∈ ©−1Ui \ S . For such
B1 and B2, it holds that ©(B1 ∨ B2) ∈ U1 ∩ U2 = U0 and B1 ∨ B2 /∈ S = ©−1U (because S is prime). Therefore we obtain
©(B1 ∨ B2) ∈ U0 \ U , and this implies U0 = U , as required. 
Putting these lemmas together, we can see that the canonical frame deﬁned above is indeed an IM©-frame, from which
the completeness follows.
The notion of IM-frames is ﬁrst considered by Wolter and Zakharyaschev [13] (actually, in their terminology, IM-frames
in this paper are called Kripke IM-frames) as a semantics for intuitionistic modal logic with  as the only primitive modality.
It is easy to see that most of the other variants of birelational Kripke frames can be reduced to IM-frames without chang-
ing satisfaction relation, as long as we consider only  as a primitive modality. For example, functional frame semantics
considered in Section 5.1 can be translated into IM©-frame as follows:
Proposition 20. For an arbitrary functional frame F = 〈W ,, R〉, consider the binary relation R ′= (R ;). Then the frame F ′ =
〈W ,, R ′〉 is an IM©-frame, and for each satisfaction relation  on W its extensions on F and F ′ coincide.
5.3. Partially functional Kripke frames
We have established the soundness and completeness theorem, and therefore IM©-frames deﬁned above capture our
logic. However, while the logic is considered a version of LTL, the condition appearing in the deﬁnition of IM©-frames do
not seem to justify linearity of time. Additionally, the intuitive meaning of the condition is not clear.
In this subsection we try to modify the semantics deﬁned above so that the resulting semantics represents the linear-
time nature more directly. We consider another class of birelational Kripke frames, in which each state has at most one
next state (although it may have no next state).
Deﬁnition 21. For an IM-frame 〈W ,, R〉, we deﬁne another relation Rs by
x Rs y ⇐⇒ ∀z.(x R z ⇐⇒ y  z).
Then, the condition appearing in the deﬁnition of IM©-frames (Deﬁnition 13(2)) is rephrased by the equality R = ( ;
Rs ). It is easy to check that the following properties also hold:
Lemma 22. If 〈W ,, R〉 is an IM©-frame, then
1. Rs is a partial function;
2. Rs preserves , that is, if x Rs y, x′ Rs y′ , and x x′ , then y  y′;
3. (Rs )−1 is a simulation relation over 〈W ,〉. In other words, the inclusion (Rs ;) ⊆ ( ; Rs ) holds.
This observation motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 23. Consider a triple 〈W ,, S〉 of a nonempty set W , a partial order  on W and a partial function S on W .
We say such a triple is an intuitionistic partially functional frame (IPF-frame, for short) if S preserves . An IPF-frame is said
to be an IPF©-frame if S−1 is a simulation relation over 〈W ,〉.
From Lemma 22, for each IM©-frame 〈W ,, R〉 we can construct an IPF©-frame 〈W ,, Rs 〉 associated to it. We denote
this construction by s. Conversely, each IPF©-frame gives rise to an IM©-frame 〈W ,, ( ; S)〉. It is easy to check that this
is indeed an IM©-frame. We denote the construction of this direction by r. We also use the notation Sr for ( ; S).
Moreover, we can show that r is a left-inverse of s. That is, when we construct an IPF©-frame from an arbitrary IM©-
frame, and transform it back to an IM©-frame, then the resulting frame is the same as the original one. This is an easy
consequence of the equality R = ( ; Rs ) mentioned above.
The semantics based on IPF©-frames can be deﬁned in the same way as before, except that we need to modify ©-clause
as follows (otherwise, the heredity condition fails):
w ©A ⇐⇒ ∀w ′, v.(w  w ′ S v ⇒ v  A)
Because w  w ′ S v in the right-hand side is equivalent to w Sr v , we have
w ©A ⇐⇒ ∀v.(w Sr v ⇒ v  A)
which is the same as the interpretation in IM-frame obtained by translation r.
K. Kojima, A. Igarashi / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1491–1503 1501Similarly, interpretation in an IM-frame is, since R = ( ; Rs ),
w ©A ⇐⇒ ∀v.(w R v ⇒ v  A)
⇐⇒ ∀w ′, v.(w  w ′ Rs v ⇒ v  A)
so this is the same as the semantics on the IPF-frame obtained by s.
In this way we can see that two semantics based on IM©-frames and IPF©-frames are equivalent. Therefore IPF©-frames
are another characterization of our logic.
5.4. Informal interpretation of the frame conditions
Above we have proved that our logic is captured by either IM©-frames or IPF©-frames, but we did not discuss what
their frame conditions mean. In this subsection we discuss the intuitive meaning of IPF©-frames.
The condition of IPF©-frames says that S−1 should be a simulation. According to the standard interpretation of Kripke
semantics for intuitionistic logic, each possible world represents a state of knowledge, and  represents an extension of
knowledge. Following this interpretation, we can say that the condition that S−1 is a simulation relation says that any
extension of knowledge at the next state can be simulated by some extension of knowledge at the current state. Actually
this is achieved in such a way that the extension by gaining a knowledge A at the next state is simulated by gaining ©A
at the current state (in fact, we implicitly used this intuitive understanding in the proof of completeness). Therefore, the
simulation condition implies that we can indeed identify An and ©n A.
In NJ© formalization, the identiﬁcation between An and ©n A is justiﬁed by rules ©I and ©E. To obtain the equivalence
of An and ©n A, it is crucial that NJ© does not assume any side condition in ©-rules, which is typically assumed in -rules
of other systems [11,16,17].
From a type-theoretic viewpoint, this corresponds to the fact that λ© can manipulate open code fragment. Indeed, other
type systems based on modal logics assuming side conditions on -rules do not allow code fragments with free variables
to be well-typed [16,17].
In this way, we can see that (although informally) there is a connection between the Kripke semantics we gave and the
characteristic feature of the typed λ-calculus λ© .
6. Concluding remarks
6.1. Summary
In this paper we have investigated a constructive LTL. We ﬁrst gave a natural deduction style proof system, and a sequent
calculus which enjoys cut elimination. We also gave a Hilbert-style proof system. After that we deﬁned Kripke semantics,
and proved soundness and completeness.
Although the temporal logic we considered is linear-time, a naive frame condition of functionality turned out to be
insuﬃcient. We considered two classes of Kripke frames, and gave the connection between two versions of our semantics.
We have also discussed relationship between frame conditions and the syntactic counterpart of the logic.
For cut elimination, we basically followed the standard method that lifts non-principal cuts and decompose cut formulas
when the cut is principal. However, to make it work correctly, extra transformations are necessary.
6.2. Two kinds of interpretation of modality
Here we would like to discuss why the straightforward formalizations result in logics which do not meet our requirement.
We rejected the distributivity law, and it is the natural consequence of a particular type-theoretic interpretation of ©
operator. However, we had to make some efforts to formalize such an LTL; we had to consider some extra side conditions
in proof rules (like ∨E), and relatively complicated frame conditions in Kripke semantics.
We consider the origin of this diﬃculty is the difference between traditional and type-theoretic interpretation of modal-
ity. Kripke semantics, which is a foundation of ordinary modal logics, is based on the idea that all possible worlds are
equally observable. However, type systems (at least some of them, including λ©) do not seem to treat all worlds equally.
When we consider Kripke semantics, we implicitly assume that we are observing the whole system (Kripke frame), and
accordingly we can inspect any state freely when judging whether a given formula is true or not. So we can say that the
usual Kripke semantics assumes a viewpoint from outside of the system.
Type-theoretic point of view does not seem to assume such an ideal observer. Instead, it can be understood well if we
consider observers inside the system. That is, an observer is assigned to each state, and a formula is considered true at some
state only if the observer in the speciﬁed state is able to verify that the formula is indeed true.
These two approaches result in different modal logics, and this explains why Kripke semantics tends to admit distribu-
tivity law (unless some special care is made), while it is plausible to reject the law in view of modal type systems. From the
outside-view, the observer can freely go back and forth between states, and inspect future states to decide whether such and
such property holds at the current state. If we take this point of view we can justify the distributivity law (in a constructive
way):
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case. If A is the case we have ©A, and similarly for B . In either case we have ©A ∨ ©B .
From the inside-view, however, each observer is assigned to a ﬁxed state, and they cannot move to other states. As a result,
the justiﬁcation above is not correct. In this setting it is possible to know that “either A or B holds at the next state”
without knowing either “A at the next state” or “B at the next state.”
As a result, to establish a Kripke semantics for type-theoretically motivated modal logic, it is necessary to emulate
internal observers’ states of knowledge in terms of possible worlds and accessibility relations. We consider this is the
primary reason of the diﬃculty we have encountered in this paper.
6.3. Algebraic semantics
In this paper we did not mention algebraic semantics and duality between frames and algebras, which is studied well in
the classical setting [18]. Related to these topics, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [13] gave a general result on an intuitionistic
analogue of the duality theory. Also, analogues of Jónsson–Tarski representation for constructive S4 and propositional lax
logic have been considered by Alechina et al. [14].
It is not diﬃcult to give a similar result for our constructive LTL. Consider a Heyting algebra equipped with a unary
operation © preserving ⊃, and call such an algebra a ©-algebra. It is easy to see that the class of ©-algebras gives a
semantics of our constructive LTL together with soundness and completeness. In a way similar to the classical case, we can
establish Jónsson–Tarski representation for ©-algebras by deﬁning translations between IM©-frames and ©-algebras.
6.4. Related work
The natural deduction system introduced in Section 2 is similar to those for intuitionistic modal logics by Martini and
Masini [16] and by Simpson [11] (aside from a few notational differences), which also use formulas with annotations
indicating where the formulas hold. However, there are some differences between their systems and ours. First, while our
©I rule does not have any side condition, -introduction rules by Martini and Masini requires that all time annotations in
the antecedent must be smaller than n + 1 (the time annotation of the succedent of the premise). There is also a similar
condition in Simpson’s one. Our ©I is actually more similar to ♦-introduction rule of Simpson’s system. Second, ∨E and
⊥E in our system are also different from theirs; these rules require time annotations of the succedents to be the same as
the main formula, but it is not the case for the two. The absence of such a restriction allows us to prove distributivity of ♦
over disjunction in their systems.
Related to the issue discussed in Section 6.2, ♦ operator without distributivity or ♦⊥ ⊃ ⊥ has been discussed in the
literature [10,12,19,14]. In particular, Kripke semantics for propositional lax logic by Fairtlough and Mendler [12] and con-
structive S4 by Alechina et al. [14] had to consider fallible worlds, possible worlds at which any proposition becomes true.
Also, Murphy et al. [20] consider a typed λ-calculus for distributed computation, which corresponds to intuitionistic S5
modal logic. Their system is based on natural deduction formalization by Simpson [11]. Although the system they formal-
ized is an implicational fragment, they discuss how to add other connectives, and point out that ⊥ and ∨ need special
consideration. In particular, when ∨ is added, it is not obvious how to deﬁne operational semantics for case splitting. This is
because, as they mention, the elimination rule for ∨ and ⊥ in Simpson’s system reasons non-locally, that is, main premise
and conclusion may have different annotations. There is a similarity between this diﬃculty and the issue we have discussed
in Section 6.2.
Since work by Davies and Pfenning [17] and Davies [4] on Curry–Howard correspondence for modal and temporal logic,
many type systems for multi-stage languages based on their work have been proposed [21–26,9,27,28]. Those languages
typically include not only quasiquotation as in λ© but also Lisp-like eval and lifting of values to code (also called cross-
stage persistence [24]). As a result, their type systems could be seen as quite different modal logics: for example, the
distributivity law would be validated if eval, which would have type ©A ⊃ A, and lifting, which would have type A ⊃ ©A,
are supported in one language. The combination of these language features is motivated by a practical reason, rather than a
correspondence with logics; it would also be interesting to investigate how these systems (more precisely, the corresponding
logics) are characterized in terms of temporal or modal logics. The second author makes such investigations [9,28], which
try to capture quasiquotation and eval by modalities like next and always in temporal logic.
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